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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to obtain estimates of the impact of worker compensation premiums 
on employment in Tasmania.  To do so it proposes a basic reduced form employment 
equation as a function of wages, output, time and lagged employment using lags and 
Australian output figures as instruments.  Using quarterly time series an estimate of the wage 
elasticity of employment for Tasmania over 1984.3 to 2008.1 is obtained that is comparable 
to other Australian employment studies.  It also estimates an annual panel model across 3-
digit industries together with worker compensation premium data to obtain a direct estimate 
of the impact of worker compensation premium on employment across Tasmania and also at 
a 1-digit industry level from 1992 to 2008. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008 the Work Cover Tasmania Board approached the School of Economics and Finance 
at the University of Tasmania to investigate the effect of raising workers compensation 
premiums on employment1.  Amongst other objectives the Work Cover Tasmania Board 
manages the workers compensation scheme and monitors the performance of scheme 
participants and provides advice to the Minister for Infrastructure, Resources, Planning and 
Workplace Relations on the policy, objectives and effectiveness of Tasmania’s workers 
compensation and related legislation2.  The Work Cover Tasmania Board wished to increase 
the scope and coverage of the workers compensation scheme but needed to increase 
premiums to do so.  Before recommending this course of action to the Minister it wanted an 
estimate of the likely effects on employment in Tasmania.  This paper is a similar study to 
that carried out by the author for Work Cover Tasmania Board for the above aim but also 
wishes to examine the effect of wages on employment. 
Workers compensation premiums (WCP) together with employer superannuation 
contributions (ESC) and payroll taxes are frequently referred to as labour on-costs since they 
are applied on top of the direct wage cost of employing labour.  Each of these labour on-costs 
should be treated differently when assessing their impact on employment, since they each 
have different levels of benefits to the employer and/or employee. 
Superannuation for the employer is a marginal cost, and effects labour demand.  For workers 
it is a form of deferred wages and so changes to superannuation levels may also alter the 
labour supply decisions of workers (or their labour effort choices).  One could use the wage 
                                                 
1 It also commissioned the Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry to conduct a survey of its members 
to obtain an estimate of the effect of raising workers compensation premiums on Tasmanian Employment. 
2 For a full description of Work Cover Tasmania’s objectives see their strategic plan at 
www.workcover.tas.gov.au. 
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elasticity of employment to estimate the effect of changing ESC, if the ESC were suitably 
discounted to the present. 
Ignoring general equilibrium effects, payroll tax provides no benefit to neither the employer 
nor employees.  Changes in payroll taxes would be a purely be a change in marginal cost for 
firms and effect labour demand.  Using the wage elasticity of employment to assess the 
employment effects of changing payroll tax, could potentially lead to misleading results as it 
does not affect the labour supply or effort as wages may. 
Most workers compensation schemes allow injured workers to either take the specified 
payment for the particular injury, but in doing so lose the right to pursue the matter through 
common law.  Thus any increase in WCP that are used to fund either an increase in payments 
or an increase in the scope of injuries covered, is likely to reduce the chance of common law 
action against the employer.  The common law action could potentially cost the employer a 
far greater amount than the WCP and so provide a benefit to the firm that would offset the 
rise in marginal costs form the higher on-costs.  Employers may not perceive this benefit, in 
which case any increase in WCP would just be an increase in costs, the same as payroll tax 
increase.  It is also possible that WCP may be increased to cover larger administrative costs 
of the scheme, which may provide little benefit to employers, although may lower their own 
administrative and communication costs. 
The effect of increased WCP on employees is even more difficult to assess.  If the increase in 
WCP were to increase the scope and coverage of payments and the probability and damage of 
a work place accident remained constant then the overall remuneration package to employees 
would have grown.  However the increased size of payments may have come from a 
realisation that the damage to the individual worker of an accident has increased in lost work 
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and leisure opportunities.  Due to these uncertainties this study ignores any effect of 
increased WCP on workers labour supply or effort. 
Public data on workers compensation premiums is quite limited.  The ABS publishes an 
annual national index of on-costs including ESC, WCP, payroll tax, split between the public 
and private sector in the appendices of ABS 6345.0 Labour Price Index.  More detailed state 
by 1-digit ANZSIC industry3 based data is available from the ABS upon request and covers 
2000-01 to 2007-084.  Using this data there would be scope for a panel data study of the 
effect of WCP on employment; however it is unlikely that any significant results would be 
obtainable at an industry level. 
Without this or more detailed data, one is left to make inferences from the wage elasticity of 
employment about the impact of WCP on employment.  Ignoring any benefits of wage rises 
on workers’ effort or labour supply, the wage elasticity of employment can be used to provide 
an upper bound estimate of the effect of raising WCP by 1% of wages.  This estimate would 
be appropriate if a dollar of WCP were considered by businesses as simply another dollar of 
costs such as payroll tax.  
This study takes two approaches to assess the impact of rasing WCP on employment.  The 
first is to estimate a reduced form equation for Tasmanian employment based on aggregate 
quarterly time series ABS data without WCP data.  This allows the wage elasticity of 
employment (WEE) to be estimated and is comparable to other studies of the Australian 
                                                 
3 ANZSIC = Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry Classification.  The broad level (1-digit) industries 
are reported in Table A8.2.2 in the Appendix. 
4 This data is also available via the ABS Time Series Plus via the DX Database in tables 6345-15 and 6345-15 
for ESC, 6345-17 and 6345-18 for Payroll Tax and 6345-19 and 6345-20 for WCP.  This sources does not 
classify on-cost by industry and state, but rather one or the other. 
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labour market.  This approach provides an upper bound on the estimate of raising WCP, but 
also allows the comparison of the Tasmanian WEE with the Australian WEE from previous 
studies. 
The second approach is to make use of confidential data supplied by Work Cover Tasmania 
covering well over 400 disaggregated 2-digit ANZSIC industries annually from 1991-92 to 
2007-08.  The dataset includes: the no. of policies, WCP, no. of employees, wages, no. of 
claims, and total payouts.  Together with other ABS data this provides a direct estimate of the 
WCP elasticity of employment (WCPEE) and also an estimate of the WEE for each broad 
level (1-digit) ANZSIC industry classification in Tasmania. 
In Section 2 of the report, the past literature on the wage elasticity of employment and the 
effect of changing workers compensation premiums is reviewed.  The data and methodology 
used in the report are explained in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.  Section 5, follows, which 
presents the results and the conclusion, is made in Section 6.  References are contained in 
Section 7 and additional information referred to in the report is contained in the section 8. 
 
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
While there have been only a few studies on the effect of changing workers compensation 
premiums, there have been numerous studies of the wage elasticity of employment.  The 
wage elasticity of employment has received considerable attention in Australia, in order to 
evaluate the various forms of centralised wage fixing that have existed, or continue to exist 
today.  In section 2.1 the two studies that consider the impact of changes in workers 
compensation premium in Australia are reviewed.  Section 2.2 reviews the studies and 
estimates of the wage elasticity of employment in Australia. 
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2.1 Studies of the economic effect of changes in workers compensation premiums 
Meagher and Parmenter (1986) use the ORANI-NAGA general equilibrium model to 
examine the effect of reducing workers’ compensation premiums Australia wide. They found 
a moderate increase in output and employment would result and a net gain to the government 
from the increased tax base. Most of the expansion occurred in sectors of the economy 
subject to international trade that are very sensitive to cost changes. 
Cerasani (1990) also used ORANI to model the complete removal of workers’ compensation 
premiums as part of the total removal of labour on-costs.  The Industry Commission (1994) 
felt this was an unrealistic policy option and so examined the long run effect of a 20 per cent 
fall in labour on-costs. In the long-run, it was assumed that the i) level of capital can change 
in response to changes in input costs; and ii) real wages vary to keep unemployment fixed at 
some 'natural' level, although the participation rate may vary. 
Industry Commission (1994), Table A9, page A18 
 
The Industry Commission (1994) states (without explaining their methodology) that the 
“…economy-wide effect of this efficiency improvement is that there is an increase in real 
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GDP of $1.75 for each dollar by which workers' compensation costs are reduced, while 
leaving workers as well off as before.”  It should be noted that the study simulation did not 
consider the indirect effects of reducing workers compensation premiums such as increased 
common law legal action, loss of safety and back to work initiatives by workers 
compensation bodies.  These costs are likely to be sizeable although very difficult to quantify.  
In a similar fashion this study will not include any benefits from raising workers 
compensation premiums, in evaluating the effect of increasing them on employment. 
The Industry Commission’s (1994) results implies that a 20% rise in labour on-costs would 
result in the opposite effects to those in Table A9, that is a fall in employment of 
approximately 0.05% (an average of the industry effects) and a fall in economic output of 
0.5%.  To place this result in terms of increasing workers compensation premium by 1% of 
real wages this result should be divided by 3.33 (as explained in Appendix 8.1), resulting in a 
fall in employment of 0.015% and fall in output 0.15%. 
The most comparable study to this one is Edmiston (2006) who examines the effect of 
workers compensation costs across 50 states of the US and the District of Columbia with 
comprehensive data from 1978 to 2000.  Edmiston (2006) estimates a three equation system 
of employment, wages and workers compensation benefits (as a proxy for workers 
compensation costs) along with a range of other exogenous variables with LIML.  Edmiston 
(2006) opts for a LIML rather than use 2SLS, due to the concern that the available 
instruments are weak.   Edmiston (2006) find that the effects of workers compensation costs 
have a significant negative effect on employment but the effect was small relative to the 
negative effect of wages on employment. The wage elasticity of employment was estimated 
to be -0.211, while the elasticity of workers compensation costs estimate was -0.011. 
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2.2 Studies of the wage elasticity of employment 
Most studies implicitly adopt a neoclassical economic framework for the formulation of the 
demand for labour and so it is assumed to be negatively related to wages and positively 
related to output.  Typically a constant elasticity of substitution production function is 
assumed and the resulting ‘demand for labour’ is a linear in logarithms function. (See section 
4 for more details).  Total employment or total hours worked is normally specified as a 
function of wages, gross domestic product and a time trend as a proxy for technical progress.  
In practice, most studies take employment to be equal to the demand for labour. 
Freebairn (1977), while not estimating any of his own parameters, concluded that the long-
run elasticity of employment with respect to output was about 0.7 and with respect to real 
wages was about -0.5. Lewis and Kirby (1988) found that the Accord had brought about a 
shift in the supply curve for labour bringing about a 10 per cent fall in real wages and a rise in 
employment of 8 per cent implying an employment elasticity with respect to real wages of –
0.8. Pissarides (1991) estimated an Australian employment real wage elasticity of -0.8. 
Russell and Tease (1990) estimated the labour demand as a log Koyck model, where the 
impact of variables decays over time for quarterly Australian data from 1969:3 to 1987:4. 
They found that wages, economic output (GDP), employment lagged and a time trend where 
all significant and of the correct sign.  In particular they found an impact wage elasticity of 
employed persons of -0.11 and -0.18 for hours decaying with coefficients of 0.82 and 0.76 
respectively for lagged employment. The long run impact of rise in wages of 1% was a -
0.61% for employed persons and -0.75% for employed hours.  
Dungey and Pitchford (1998), using more recent data estimate an elasticity with respect to 
real wages of –0.4. Debelle and Vickery (1998), advocate employment elasticity with respect 
to real wages of –0.7 for the period 1969 to 1997 and lower at-0.4 from 1979. Bernie and 
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Downes (1999) suggest that the differences in estimates are due to variations in definitions, 
methodology and data. Their results from the TRYM model suggest an employment elasticity 
of about -0.6 with respect to real wages. 
Lewis and McDonald (2002) outline a number of dissatisfactions with previous work on the 
wage elasticity of employment.  They criticise i) the previous interpretation of the coefficient 
on wages as an output constant wage elasticity of employment, which they demonstrate is not 
the case for a CES production function; ii) that the endogeneity of wages is not considered 
and iii) previous economic and econometric models.  They use an autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) approach that models a long run relationship within an autoregressive error-
correction model. They estimate that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
is -0.45 and given a labour share of GDP of 0.6, translates to output constant wage elasticity 
of employment of (0.45 x (1 - 0.6)) = -0.2.  However taking into the cost saving effect on 
output and assuming a elasticity of employment for output of 1 (unitary), results in a total 
wage elasticity of employment of – (0.2 + 0.6 x 1) = -0.8.  Luckily this is close to previous 
estimates of the total wage elasticity of employment obtained from incorrectly interpreting 
results. 
Dowrick and Wells (2004) explain that Lewis and McDonald (2002)’s interpretation is 
incorrect, and that the output constant elasticity of demand is simply the coefficient on log 
wages in an equation with log employment as the dependent variable. 
In summary, the results for Australia suggest a wage elasticity of employment of about -0.4 
to -0.8, which is higher than most other countries (see Hamermesh 1993).  As previously 
stated, the wage elasticity of employment can be used as an estimate of raising workers 
compensation premiums by 1% of wages, particularly as the extreme case.  The previous 
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literature for Australia suggests that an increase in workers compensation premiums of 1% of 
wages will result in a -0.4% to -0.8% fall in employment.  
 
3 DATA 
For the aggregate time series study, seasonally adjusted quarterly data on the Employed 
Persons (Lt), nominal Average Weekly Earnings (Wt) and nominal Gross State Product (Qt) 
for Tasmania together with data on the nominal Gross Domestic Product for Australia (Gt) 
was obtained from www.abs.gov.au. For more details on the source and nature of the time 
series data, see Table A8.2.1 in the Appendix.  The data ranges from September 1984 to 
March 2008 and includes quarterly 95 observations in total.  Figure 3.1 contains time series 
charts for Employed Persons (TAS_EMPPER) and nominal Average Weekly Earnings 
(TAS_AWE) and Gross State Product (TAS_GSP) for Tasmania and Australian Gross 
Domestic Product (AUS_GDP).  Note the apparent correlation between Et,Wt, and Qt, 
especially in last decade.   
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Figure 3.1 Quarterly Time Series Tasmanian Data Labour Function Data 
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For the annual panel study, data from Work Cover Tasmania was obtained for: the number of 
employees, premiums charged and wages paid for each 3-digit ANZSIC industry 
classification.  This data was merged with data from ABS 5222.0 on nominal value added 
contribution to GSP for Tasmania and GDP for Australia (measures of output) attributable to 
each broad level (1-digit) ANZSIC industry. 
The panel covers 455 3-digit ANZSIC industries, generally covering data from 1992 to 2008, 
but not for all industries (that is the panel is unbalanced).  Observations for which the number 
of employees are equal to zero are removed, resulting in 7159 observations, consisting of 455 
3-digit ANZSIC industries covering up to 17 years.  Using variables lagged by up to two 
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years, reduces the final sample used in estimation to 447 3-digit ANZSIC industries covering 
up to 15 years, which contain 6190 observations.  The mean across 3-digit industries of the 
variables used in panel study are displayed in Figure 3.2 below and in Table A8.2.2 in the 
Appendix. 
 
Figure 3.2 Panel Data – Average per 3-digit Tasmanian Industry 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
Lewis and MacDonald (2002) illustrate that many estimated employment equations can be 
viewed as the first order condition for profit maximisation with respect to labour inputs 
within the neoclassical framework assuming a CES production function.  Lewis and 
MacDonald warn that in this case, the coefficients estimates can not be directly interpreted as 
elasticities of employment. 
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This study uses a reduced form employment equation, representing the interaction of the 
demand and supply for labour.  It does not make any explicit assumptions about the 
underlying production function that gives rise to the labour demand function nor the form of 
the labour supply function. This has the advantage that the wage elasticity of employment 
(WEE) can be directly obtained from the estimates.  
The functional form chosen is largely the same as previous studies that have estimated 
employment equations, many were incorrectly labelled as “labour demand equations”.  In 
each period t Employment (Lt) is modelled as a function of nominal wages (Wt), output (Qt) 
and time (t).  An infinite geometric lag model of log employment is chosen   
 
2
1 2
2
1 2
ln ln ln ln ......
               ln ln ln ......
               
t W t W t W t
Q t Q t Q t
t
L W W W
Q Q Q
t u
α β β λ β λ
β β λ β λ
γ
− −
− −
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ +
 (1) 
where  Wβ  is the instantaneous wage elasticity of employment, 
 Qβ  is the instantaneous output elasticity of employment, 
 λ  is the rate of decay in the wage and output elasticities overtime, 0 1< λ < , 
 γ  is the change in employment holding output and wages constant, 
 α  is the intercept term 
 ( )2~ 0,t uu IID σ  is the error term in period t  .   
The long run elasticities 2 3 ...β βλ βλ βλ+ + + +  can be simplified to ( )1β λ−  and the 
mean lag is given by ( )1λ λ− .  By using the Koyck transformation it can be shown that (1) 
can be expressed as   
 ( )0 1ln ln ln 1 lnt W t Q t t tL W Q t L vβ β β γ λ λ −= + + + − + +  (2) 
where  ( )0 1β α λ λγ= − +  and 1t t tv u u −= −λ . 
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Note that the error term is now a moving average and exhibits serial correlation 
( )1cov , 0t tv v − ≠  leading to inefficient estimates, unless it is taken into consideration in 
estimation.  More importantly 1ln tL −  is correlated with the error term, ( )1cov , ln 0t tv L − ≠ , 
since 1ln tL −  and tv  are both functions of 1tu − , leading to biased estimates.  The other possible 
problem with equation (2) is that wages (Wt) and output (Qt) are likely to be endogenously 
determined by employment ( tL ) and each other.  OLS estimation of (2) will result in biased 
estimates if the explanatory variables: 1ln tL − , ln tW  and ln tQ , are correlated with the error 
term.  Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), where the troublesome variables are replaced with 
their estimates based on instrumental or exogenous variables, is used to counter this 
estimation problem. 
 
4.1 Aggregate Tasmanian Employment Equation 
For the aggregated Tasmanian quarterly time series model, the employment equation is 
specified 
 1 2 3 4 1ln ln ln lnt o t t t tL W Q t L vα α α α α −= + + + + +  (3) 
where,  ln tL is the logarithm of employed persons in Tasmania in quarter t, 
 1ln tL −  is the logarithm of employed persons in Tasmania in quarter t-1, 
 ln tW  is the logarithm of nominal average weekly earnings in Tasmania in quarter t, 
 ln tQ  is the logarithm of Gross State Product in Tasmania in quarter t,  
 t is a time trend used to capture technical change, and  
 tv  is a moving average error term in period t, ( )( )2 2~ 0, 1t uv λ σ+  
While this study does not specify the structural relationship between employment, wages, and 
output it recognises that they are all endogenous to one another.  For this reason 2SLS is used 
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with instruments being: the logarithm of Australian GDP as well as its 1st and 2nd quarter 
lags, (i.e. ln tG , 1ln tG −  and 2ln tG − ), the 2
nd quarter lags of Tasmanian GSP, ( 2ln tQ − ), the 2
nd 
quarter lag of log employment ( 2ln tL − ) and nominal wages, ( 2ln tW − ).  These exogenous 
variables ensure over-identification with six exogenous variables and four endogenous 
variables. 
 
4.2 Tasmanian Employment Equation For Panel Data 
For the panel data the generic employment equation to be estimated is 
 , 0 1 , 2 , 3 4 , 1 5 , ,ln ln ln ln lni t i t I t i t i t i i tL W Q t L P vθ θ θ θ θ θ μ−= + + + + + + +  (4) 
where, ,ln i tL is the logarithm of employed persons in Tasmania in year t in 3-digit industry i, 
 , 1ln i tL −  is the logarithm of employed persons in Tasmania in year t-1 in 3-digit 
industry i, 
 ,ln i tW  is the logarithm of nominal wage in Tasmania in year t in 3-digit industry i,, 
 ,ln I tQ  is the logarithm of the value added in Tasmania in year t, in each 1-digit 
industry I, 
 ,ln i tP  is the logarithm of the premiums paid in year t, in each 3-digit industry i, 
 t is a time trend and 2t  a squared time trend 
 iμ  ( )2~ 0,IID μσ  is a random effect in each 3-digit industry i  
 ,i tv  is a moving average error term, serially correlated for a given i. 
In order to allow for broad industry specific behaviour and to be able to obtain industry 
specific estimates of the effect of elasticity of employment w.r.t WCP and wages the panel 
model is also estimated with broad industry I varying coefficients on ,ln i tW  ( 1,Iφ ) and ,ln i tP  
( 6,Iφ ), for , ,...I A B Q=   as specified in (5) below with fixed effects 
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 , 0, 1, , 2 , 5 , 1 6, ,ln ln ln ln lni t i I i t I t i t I i t itL W Q L P vφ φ φ φ φ−= + + + + +  (5) 
and also random effects 
 , 0 1, , , 5 , 1 6, ,ln ln ln ln lni t I i t I t i t I i t i itL W Q L P vϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ μ−= + + + + + +  (6) 
Each 1-digit industry in I consists of a set of mutually exclusive 3-digit industries from i. 
The variables used as instruments in the 2SLS panel estimation are the log of the Value 
Added in Australia in year t, t-1 and t-2, in each 1-digit industry I, (i.e. ,ln I tG , , 1ln I tG −  and 
, 2ln I tG − ), the 1
st and 2nd quarter lags of the log of the Value Added in Tasmania in each 1-
digit industry I, (i.e. ,ln I tQ , , 1ln I tQ −  and , 2ln I tQ − ), as well as lagged log nominal wages and 
the 2nd quarter lag of log employment in each 3-digit industry i, ( , 1ln i tW −  and , 2ln i tL − , 
respectively). 
 
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Aggregate Tasmanian Employment Equation 
Allowing for lags, the 2SLS was estimated over 92 quarterly observations with lags of the 
variables from the employment equation, Australian GDP and a time-trend being used as 
instruments.  While all of the variables used in the estimation of equation (3) were non-
stationary, the residuals from the 2SLS estimation are stationary (using an ADF test at the 1% 
level) providing evidence that the relationship is cointegrated.  The inclusion of the moving-
average term drastically improves the Durbin Watson statistic and removes most of the 
autocorrelation in the model.  Any remaining affects of autocorrelation on the standard errors 
is mitigated with the Newey-West Correction.  Table 5.1 contains the essential results of 
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estimating equation (3) with EViews 6.0.  The full results are contained in Table 8.3.1 in 
Appendix 8.3. 
Table 5.1 2SLS Estimates of Tasmanian Employed Persons  
Variable  C lnWt lnQt T lnLt-1 MA(1) 
Coefficient  1.7294 -0.1138 0.1894 -0.0010 0.7965 0.1313 
P Value  [0.0555] [0.0643] [0.0720] [0.1906] [0.0000] [0.5110] 
 Dependent Variable lnEt  
DW = 
1.580 R
2 = 0.973 2R  0.972=
 Newey-West HAC SE     IVs: lnQt-2, lnGt, lnGt-1, lnGt-2, lnWt-2, lnEt-2,
 
The results in Table 5.1 indicate that the model fits the data quite well, with a good R-squared 
and the coefficients of interest upon ln tW , ln tQ  and 1ln tL −  are significant and of the correct 
sign.  The coefficients on ln tW  and ln tQ  are the instantaneous wage and output elasticities 
of employment.  The coefficient of 0.189 upon ln tQ  suggests a 10% rise in Tasmanian GSP 
would be associated with a 1.89% rise in employment.  The coefficient of the time trend was 
negative, but very small and insignificant. 
The estimated coefficient on ln tW  in Table 5.1 above, indicates that the initial impact on 
employment of 1% rise in wages would be a fall of 0.114%.  The coefficient on lagged log 
employment of 0.796 indicates that in the next quarter this effect would be (0.796 x -0.114) = 
-0.091 suggesting that a 1% rise in wages would result in a fall of 0.091%.  The following 
quarter the effect would be 0.7962 x -0.114) = -0.072 a fall of 0.072% and so on.  Leading 
eventually to a total long run (LR) impact of (1/(1-0.796) x -0.114) = -0.559, a fall in 
employment of 0.56% in response to a 1% rise in wages.  The median lag for this Koyck 
model is 3 quarters5, suggesting that half this long run effect of -0.56%, would be felt in a 
                                                 
5 The median lag for the Koyck model is ln 2 ln λ− . 
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little under a year.  The long run elasticity of -0.56 is in the range of previous Australian 
estimates of the wage elasticity of employment that vary from -0.4 to -0.8. 
In March 2008 there 229,600 people employed in Tasmania, thus a coefficient of 0.114 on 
wages implies a 1% rise in wages would result in an initial decline 208 employed persons 
rising to 1,284 employed persons in the long run.  This estimate can be considered the 
extreme case of workers compensation premiums being treated identical to all other labour 
costs including wages. 
The equation (3) was also estimated replacing employed persons (L) with employed hours 
(HRS) and the results are contained in contained in Table 8.3.2 in Appendix 8.3.  The results 
in that table show the model in this study can not explain the movements in hours worked in 
Tasmania as well as it can for employed persons with the R2 of 0.513 and none of the 
variables significant other than the constant. 
 
5.2 Tasmanian Employment Equation For Panel Data 
An unbalanced panel of 442 fine-level industries from 1994 to 2008 providing 6047 
observations was used to estimate an equation (4) for employment using 2SLS with random 
effects and cross-section weights applied to the standard errors.  The variables used as 
instruments in the 2SLS panel estimation are the log of the Value Added in Australia in year 
t, t-1 and t-2, in each 1-digit industry I, (i.e. ,ln I tG , , 1ln I tG −  and , 2ln I tG − ), the 2
nd quarter lag 
of the log of the Value Added in Tasmania in each 1-digit industry I, (i.e. , 2ln I tQ − ), as well as 
the 2nd quarter lags of log wages and log employment in each 3-digit industry i, ( , 2ln i tW −  and 
, 2ln i tL − , respectively), a time trend and time trend squared for each 1-digit industry and a 
constant for each 3-digit industry. 
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On the whole, using both common and individual unit root tests available in EViews 6.0 for 
panels, lnEi,t, and PR100i,t were stationary , lnWi,t, was trend stationary, while lnQI,t, was non-
stationary.  However cointegration tests indicate that the variables in (4) are cointegrated.  
Moving average error terms are not permitted in EViews 6.0, thus the estimates may suffer 
from being inefficient however the Durbin Watson statistic indicates there is no problem with 
autocorrelation.  Period SUR was used to adjust the standard errors. 
Table 5.2 contains the essential results and the LR wage and WCP elasticities of employment 
for of estimating equation (4) using both random and fixed effects. The full results for the 
random and fixed effects models are contained in Table 8.3.3 and Table 8.3.4, respectively, in 
Appendix 8.3.  As for the quarterly time series estimation, the results in Table 5.2 indicate 
that the fixed effects model fits the data quite well.  In addition all the coefficients are 
significant at the 5% significance, except the coefficient on ln tW  which is significant at 10%.  
The random and fixed effects estimates are not dissimilar. 
Concentrating on the fixed effects results the instantaneous wage elasticity of employment of 
-0.11964 suggest a 1% rise in average wages per week would be associated with a 0.112% 
fall in employment.  The coefficient on lagged log employment of 0.7111 indicates that in the 
next year this effect would be (0.7111 x -0.11964) = -0.08494 suggesting that a 1% rise in 
wages would result in a fall of 0.085%.  The total long run (LR) impact of (1/(1-0.7111) x -
0.11964) = -0.4135, a fall in employment of 0.413% in response to a 1% rise in wages.  The 
long run wage elasticity of employment estimate from the panel data of -0.41 is similar to the 
time series estimate of -0.56 and other previous Australian estimates.  The median lag for this 
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Koyck model of 2 years6 suggests that half the fall of 0.413% would occur in 2years seems 
appropriate. 
Table 5.2 2SLS Estimates for Panel Data with Random Effects  
 Random Effects Fixed Effects 
     
Wφ  (coefficient on lnWt ) -0.0941 * -0.1194* 
Qφ  (coefficient on lnQt ) 0.0787 ** 0.1046** 
Lφ  (coefficient on lnLt-1) 0.7241 ** 0.7111** 
Pφ  (coefficient on PR100t) -0.0042 ** -0.0047** 
0φ  (constant) 1.3955 ** 1.5071** 
1W Lφ φ−  -0.3410 * -0.4135* 
1P Lφ φ−  -0.0153 ** -0.0162** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5404  0.9445 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9309  1.9134 
 
Of note in Table 5.2 is that the impact of raising workers compensation premium rate (as a 
%) is much smaller about 4% the size and significant negative effect on employment. The 
coefficient on the WCP as a percentage of wages, PR100, suggests that an absolute rise of 1% 
in the premium rate, for example 1.2% to 2.2%, would lower employment by 0.005% in the 
current year. The total long run (LR) impact of (1/(1-0.7111) x  -0.0047) = -0.0162, a fall in 
employment of 0.016% in response to an absolute rise of 1% in the premium rate. 
Table 5.3 below, provides the 1-digit industry specific panel estimates with fixed effects of 
the long run impact on employment of raising wages by 1% and raising WCP by 1% of 
wages from estimating equation (5) using 2SLS and OLS7.  Full results are contained in 
Table A8.3.5. 
                                                 
6 The median lag for the Koyck model is ln 2 ln λ− . 
7 Fixed effects estimation provided very similar estimates to those in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Panel Data with Fixed Effects Estimates of the LR Impact of raising Wages and 
Workers Compensation Premiums (WCP)  by 1% of wages  
Cod
e 
Industry 
2SLS-FE OLS-FE 
Wages 
↑1% of 
wages 
,W Iφ
WCP  
↑1% of wage
,
1
P I
L
φ
φ−  
Wages 
↑1% of 
wages  
,W Iφ  
WCP  
↑1% of 
wages 
,P Iφ
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing -0.1463   -0.0611   -0.7618 ** -0.0754 **
B Mining -1.5749 * -0.0958   -0.8844 ** -0.0516   
C Manufacturing -1.0157 ** -0.0205 ** -0.4066 ** -0.0100 **
D Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 2.5961 ** 0.2323   0.8839 * 0.1148   
E Construction 0.0181   -0.0728   -0.5078 * -0.1018 *
F Wholesale Trade -0.1108   0.0728   -0.9065 ** 0.0819   
G Retail Trade 0.9092 ** 0.1591 ** -0.0425   0.1475   
H Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants -0.2513   -0.0837   -1.2050 ** -0.0170   
I Transport and Storage -0.3655   -0.1060 * 0.2425   -0.0576 *
J Communication Services 0.2602   -0.0793   -0.7648   -0.1824   
K Finance and Insurance 0.0239   -0.0321   -0.8600 ** -0.0789   
L Property and Business Services 0.9433   0.1971 ** -0.0361   0.1157 **
M Government Administration and Defence -0.7480   -0.0467   0.4918   0.0517   
N Education -0.6178   0.2614 ** 0.4594   0.3798 **
O Health and Community Services 0.4601   -0.0220   0.3476   -0.0235   
P Cultural and Recreational Services -0.1521   -0.2086 ** -0.4370 * -0.2551 **
Q Personal and Other Services 0.4827   -0.0151   -0.6851 * -0.0974 **
  Qφ  (coefficient on lnQt ) 0.0814 *    0.1130 **    
  Lφ  (coefficient on lnLt-1 ) 0.6902 **    0.6993 **    
  0φ  (constant) 1.4486 **    1.4527 **    
  Adjusted R-squared 0.9387      0.9408      
  Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.8606      1.9054      
** Indicates impact parameter is statistically significant from zero at the α = 5% level of significance. 
* Indicates impact parameter is statistically significant from zero at the α = 10% level of significance. 
 
The effect of the reduction in the degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of the 34 industry 
specific wage and WCP effect is evident in Table 5.3 with many parameters insignificant.  
The 2SLS long run wage elasticities results vary more widely than the OLS results, -1.6 to 
+2.6 for 2SLS compared to -1.2 to 0.88 for OLS and are on the whole less significant.  Of 
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course the OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent if the regressors are correlated with 
the error term.  An examination of the residuals and the sample regressors indicates that this 
is the case for wage variable and so the OLS will not be discussed further.   
Table 5.3 shows only four of the 17 long run wage elasticities of employment are significant:  
-1.6 for Mining, -1.0 for Manufacturing, +0.9 for Retail Trade and +2.6 for Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply.  The standard errors of the impact wage elasticities estimates (not reported 
here) are less varied ranging from 0.06 to 0.18 and thus it is only the larger of the impact 
wage elasticities that are significant.  While the positive estimates may implausible, it must 
be remembered that the equations in this study and equation (5) are reduced form 
employment equations and not labour demand equations.  The range of estimates while large 
for some industries seems plausible when considering the average effect of -0.4 from 
estimating equation (4).  The estimates of the WCP elasticity of employment in Table 5.3 
also vary considerably from -0.20 and 0.26 and only 6 out of the 17 estimates are significant 
at 10%. This range also seems plausible given the estimate of -0.02 from estimating equation 
(4). 
Table 5.3 shows only four of the 17 long run wage elasticities of employment are significant:  
-1.6 for Mining, -1.0 for Manufacturing, +0.9 for Retail Trade and +2.6 for Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply.  The standard errors of the impact wage elasticities estimates (not reported 
here) are less varied ranging from 0.06 to 0.18 and thus it is only the larger of the impact 
wage elasticities that are significant.  While the positive estimates may implausible, it must 
be remembered that the equations in this study and equation (5) are reduced form 
employment equations and not labour demand equations.  The range of estimates while large 
for some industries seems plausible when considering the average effect of -0.4 from 
estimating equation (4).  The estimates of the WCP elasticity of employment in Table 5.3 
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also vary considerably from -0.20 and 0.20 and only 6 out of the 17 estimates are significant 
at 10%. This range also seems plausible given the estimate of -0.02 from estimating equation 
(4). 
To facilitate a valid comparison of the magnitude of wage and WCP employment elasticities 
at a 1-digit level the Manufacturing will be examined further. The estimates in Table 5.3 
suggest that a 1% rise in wages in Manufacturing would result in a 1.02% fall in employment, 
while a rise in WCP by 1% of wages would result in a fall of employment by 0.02%.  These 
results that in manufacturing in Tasmania the effect is only about 1/50th , rather 1/1.2 = 0.83 
as the 20% labour on-costs would imply if WCP had the same effect as wages.  Thus it would 
appear that there are benefits of workers compensation to employers in manufacturing.  This 
appears to be the case for most other industries with the WCP employment elasticity 
generally half or less that of the wage employment elasticity. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This study specifies a reduced form employment equation as a function of output, wages and 
lagged employment.  Estimates of this equation using 2SLS on Tasmanian quarterly date 
found an initial wage elasticity of employment of -0.114 and a long run wage elasticity of 
employment of -0.559.  This implies that that a rise in workers compensation premium by 1% 
of wages would at worse result in employment falling 0.56%, with half this effect to be felt 
over the first 3 quarters after the event.  
The employment equation was re-specified to include workers compensation premiums and 
estimated over a final panel of 447 3-digit ANZSIC Tasmanian industries from 1994 to 2008. 
The panel data study found that across all industries, a 1% rise in wages implies an initial fall 
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of employment by 0.12% in the first year and long run fall of 0.41% with half this effect to 
occur with in 2 years.  More importantly this model and data allowed a direct estimate of 
impact of workers compensation premiums (WCP).  The model implied that a rise in WCP by 
1% of wages would lead to an initial fall of 0.005% in employment in the first year and a fall 
in employment of 0.02% in the long run.  The impact of an increase in WCP of 1% of wages 
is estimated to be only 1/20th of the effect of raising wage by 1%.  This suggests that 
employers believe that there are benefits to paying WCP, such as a reduced chance of 
common law legal action. 
Attempting to estimate wage and WCP elasticities of employment for each 17 Tasmanian 1-
digit industries within the panel began to stretch the capability of the sample size, with only 
about a quarter of estimates significant.  What it did illustrate was that there was considerable 
variation in the estimates across industries.  Wages elasticities of employment varied from -
1.6 for Mining, to +2.6 for Electricity, Gas and Water.  In addition to Mining, Manufacturing 
was also very responsive to wages with an elasticity of -1.0.  WCP elasticities of employment 
varied from -0.20 Cultural and Recreational Services, to +0.26 for Education. 
 
This study as found estimates for Tasmania that suggests the effect of raising workers 
compensation premiums by 1% of wages is considerably less than the effect of raising wages 
by 1% suggesting that employers believe that there are benefits to paying WCP and workers 
compensation schemes. 
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8 APPENDICES 
8.1 Converting Elasticities of Employment  
8.1.1 Relationships between Total Labour Costs, Wages and Premiums 
Labour 
On-Costs = 
Workers 
Compensation 
Premiums 
+ 
Employer 
Superannuation 
Contributions 
+ Pay Roll Tax 
LOC = WCP + ESC + PRT 
 
Total 
Labour 
Costs 
= Wages  + Labour On-Costs 
TLC = W + LOC 
 
LOC = WCP + ESC + PRT 
LOC / W = WCP / W + ESC / W + PRT / W 
LOCR = WCPR + ESCR + PRTR 
 
In which case TLC may be expressed 
TLC = W ×  (1+LOCR) 
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8 APPENDICES 
8.1 Converting Elasticities of Employment  
8.1.2 Equivalent Changes in Labour Costs, Wages and Premiums 
Starting with expression for Total Labour Costs 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
1 1
TLC LOCR W
TLC TLCdTLC dW dLOCR
W LOCR
dTLC LOCR dW WdLOCR
LOCR dWdTLC WdLOCR
TLC LOCR W LOCR W
= +
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂
= + +
+= ++ +
 
 ( )% % % 1
LOCRTLC W LOCR
LOCR
Δ = Δ + Δ +  
 
Thus an equivalent percentage rise in the wage to a %rise in the LOCR is given by  
 ( )% % 1
LOCRW LOCR
LOCR
Δ = Δ +  
An example 
Consider the case of the Industry Commission (1994) report where they considered a 20% 
change in LOC from the current level LOCR of 20% of wages, then from the formulas above 
it can be seen that TLC have risen by 4%.  An equivalent way of achieving this increase in 
TLC would be for wages to rise by 3.33% since it will be inflated by LOCR of 20%, so that a 
3.33% ∆W x 1.20 = 4%∆TLC 
Or simply using equation () gives ( )
20%% 20% 3.33%
1 20%
WΔ = =+
  
 
Now also consider a possible increase in the WCPR  
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( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
1 1 1
% % %
1 1
TLC LOCR W
TLC TLC LOCRdTLC dW dLOCR W dWCPR
W LOCR WCPR
dTLC LOCR dW WdLOCR WdWCPR
LOCR dWdTLC WdLOCR WdWCPR
TLC LOCR W LOCR W LOCR W
LOCR dWCPRTLC W LOCR
LOCR LOCR
= +
∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂
= + + +
+= + ++ + +
Δ = Δ + Δ ++ +
 
 
Another example 
Consider the Industry Commission (1994) report again where they considered a 20% change 
in LOC from the current level LOCR of 20% of wages, then from the formulas above it can 
be seen that TLC have risen by 4%.  An equivalent way of achieving this increase in TLC 
would be for the WCPR to increase by 4% of wages (for example from 2% of wages to 6% of 
wages). 
 
 
%  
20% 20%
4%
LOCR LOCR WCPR
WCPR
WCPR
Δ = Δ
× = Δ
Δ =
% 
 
8.1.3 Wage Elasticity of Employment 
  % /
% /
L
w
L L LWEE e
W W W
Δ Δ= = =Δ Δ  
 
8.2 Data Sources and Information 
Table A8.2.1 Detailed Source of Time Series Data  
Variable Source Details 
Employment (Lt) ABS 6202.0.55.001 Labour Force, 
Australia, Spreadsheets 
Employed - total; Persons; 
Seasonally Adjusted month 
converted to quarterly.  
Wages (Wt) ABS 6302.0 Average Weekly Earnings Seasonally Adjusted: AWE: 
Tasmanian: Persons: Total 
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earnings: All employees 
$ /week 
Output – GSP 
(Qt)  
ABS 5206.0 Australian National 
Accounts: National Income, Expenditure 
and Product 
Table 27. State Final Demand, Detailed 
Components: Tasmania. 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Nominal GDP $m 
Output – GDP 
(Gt) 
ABS 5206.0 Australian National 
Accounts: National Income, Expenditure 
and Product 
Table 27. State Final Demand, Detailed 
Components: Tasmania. 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Nominal GSP $m 
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Table A8.2.2 ANZSIC Industries at 1-Digit level 
Code  1 Digit ANZSIC Industry 
A  Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
B  Mining 
C  Manufacturing 
D  Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
E  Construction 
F  Wholesale Trade 
G  Retail Trade 
H  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 
I  Transport and Storage 
J  Communication Services 
K  Finance and Insurance 
L  Property and Business Services 
M  Government Administration and Defence 
N  Education 
O  Health and Community Services 
P  Cultural and Recreational Services 
Q  Personal and Other Services 
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 Table 8.2.2 Means of the Panel Data variables across 3-digit Industries 
YEAR L W Q PR100 
1993 334 240.8 656 2.02 
1994 481 177.8 732 2.50 
1995 397 192.2 720 3.00 
1996 328 185.6 667 3.70 
1997 360 178.3 754 3.86 
 1998 319 185.9 685 4.00 
1999 256 225.8 747 3.92 
2000 291 356.2 767 4.13 
2001 335 395 876 5.18 
2002 250 339.9 1,037 5.39 
2003 261 289.9 938 4.46 
2004 225 312.2 971 3.96 
2005 211 343.7 1,011 3.60 
2006 189 378.7 1,091 3.09 
2007 182 342.6 932 3.12 
2008 138 378.6 1,023 3.05 
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8.3 Additional Results  
Table A8.3.1 2SLS Estimates of Tasmania Employed Persons from Quarterly Time 
Series  
Dependent Variable: LOG(E)   
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 30/07/09   Time: 04:55   
Sample (adjusted): 1985Q2 2008Q1  
Included observations: 92 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
MA Backcast: 1985Q1   
Instrument list: TIME LOG(Q(-2)) LOG(G(-1)) LOG(G(-2)) LOG(G)  T LOG(E( 
        -2)) LOG(W(-2))   
Lagged dependent 
variable & regressors 
added to instrument list     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LOG(W) -0.113837 0.060728 -1.874528 0.0643 
LOG(Q) 0.189353 0.103937 1.821797 0.0720 
C 1.729355 0.890747 1.941466 0.0555 
LOG(E(-1)) 0.796512 0.112351 7.089475 0.0000 
T -0.000993 0.000753 -1.319320 0.1906 
MA(1) 0.131330 0.198979 0.660022 0.5110 
R-squared 0.973354     Mean dependent var 12.20454 
Adjusted R-squared 0.971805     S.D. dependent var 0.059209 
S.E. of regression 0.009942     Sum squared resid 0.008501 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.580446     Second-Stage SSR 1.187805 
Inverted MA Roots      -.13   
 
 
 
Table A8.3.2 2SLS Estimates of Tasmania Employed Hours from Quarterly Time 
Series 
Dependent Variable: LOG(HRS)   
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 30/07/09   Time: 05:39   
Sample (adjusted): 1985Q3 2008Q1  
Included observations: 91 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
MA Backcast: 1985Q2   
Instrument list:  LOG(Q(-2)) LOG(G(-1)) LOG(G(-2)) LOG(G)  LOG(HRS(-2)) 
        LOG(W(-2)) T   
Lagged dependent 
variable & regressors 
added to instrument list     
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 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LOG(W) -0.236868 0.296190 -0.799716 0.4261 
LOG(Q) 0.594896 0.393594 1.511446 0.1344 
C 5.986625 2.986876 2.004310 0.0482 
LOG(HRS(-1)) -0.031733 0.484534 -0.065492 0.9479 
T -0.003832 0.002299 -1.666713 0.0993 
MA(1) 0.002284 0.510228 0.004477 0.9964 
R-squared 0.540061     Mean dependent var 8.804251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.513006     S.D. dependent var 0.060193 
S.E. of regression 0.042006     Sum squared resid 0.149981 
F-statistic 20.25576     Durbin-Watson stat 2.025583 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Second-Stage SSR 0.147385 
Inverted MA Roots      -.00   
 
 
Table A8.3.3 2SLS Estimates for Panel Data with Random Effects 
Dependent Variable: LOG(E)   
Method: Panel Two-Stage EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 12/08/09   Time: 00:28   
Sample: 1992 2008 IF E>1 AND E(-1)>1 AND E(-2)>1 AND AWE>1 AND 
        AWE(-2)>1   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 442   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6047  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Instrument list: C LOG(Q(-2)) LOG(G) LOG(G(-1)) LOG(G(-2)) LOG(E(-2)) 
        PR100 LOG(AWE(-2)) T*@EXPAND(IND) T^2*@EXPAND(IND) 
        @EXPAND(ANZSIC)   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LOG(AWE) -0.094102 0.053519 -1.758299 0.0787 
LOG(Q) 0.078673 0.036675 2.145124 0.0320 
LOG(E(-1)) 0.724072 0.012626 57.34869 0.0000 
PR100 -0.004225 0.001567 -2.695472 0.0070 
C 1.395511 0.205018 6.806784 0.0000 
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.  Rho   
Cross-section random 1.945246 0.9571 
Idiosyncratic random 0.411616 0.0429 
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.540381     Mean dependent var 0.278821 
Adjusted R-squared 0.540076     S.D. dependent var 0.586758 
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S.E. of regression 0.397926     Sum squared resid 956.7209 
F-statistic 682.4519     Durbin-Watson stat 1.930858 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Second-Stage SSR 1433.767 
Instrument rank 483.000000    
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.862973     Mean dependent var 5.010690 
Sum squared resid 2348.036     Durbin-Watson stat 0.786739 
Second-Stage SSR 2825.082    
 
 
Table A8.3.4 2SLS Estimates for Panel Data with Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: LOG(E)   
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 12/08/09   Time: 00:23   
Sample: 1992 2008 IF E>1 AND E(-1)>1 AND E(-2)>1 AND AWE>1 AND 
        AWE(-2)>1   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 442   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6047  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Instrument list: C LOG(Q(-2)) LOG(G) LOG(G(-1)) LOG(G(-2)) LOG(E(-2)) 
        PR100 LOG(AWE(-2)) T*@EXPAND(IND) T^2*@EXPAND(IND) 
        @EXPAND(ANZSIC)   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LOG(AWE) -0.119446 0.064090 -1.863728 0.0624 
LOG(Q) 0.104553 0.044148 2.368223 0.0179 
LOG(E(-1)) 0.711118 0.013993 50.82017 0.0000 
PR100 -0.004694 0.001760 -2.667086 0.0077 
C 1.507112 0.224928 6.700407 0.0000 
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.944520     Mean dependent var 5.010690 
Adjusted R-squared 0.940112     S.D. dependent var 1.683505 
S.E. of regression 0.411989     Sum squared resid 950.6855 
F-statistic 138.4998     Durbin-Watson stat 1.913435 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Second-Stage SSR 1427.505 
Instrument rank 483.000000    
 
 
Table A8.3.5 2SLS Estimates for Panel Data with Fixed Effects with Industry Specific  
Wage and Workers Compensation Premium Effects 
Dependent Variable: LOG(E)   
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Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 09/08/09   Time: 21:14   
Sample: 1992 2008 IF E>1 AND E(-1)>1 AND E(-2)>1 AND AWE>1 AND 
        AWE(-2)>1   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 442   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6047  
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Instrument list: C LOG(Q(-2)) LOG(G) LOG(G(-1)) LOG(G(-2)) LOG(E(-2)) 
        PR100*@EXPAND(IND) LOG(AWE(-2))*@EXPAND(IND) T 
        *@EXPAND(IND) T^2*@EXPAND(IND) @EXPAND(ANZSIC) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.448587 0.292585 4.950995 0.0000 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="A") -0.045330 0.081662 -0.555101 0.5788 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="B") -0.487972 0.260827 -1.870867 0.0614 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="C") -0.314722 0.083612 -3.764092 0.0002 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="D") 0.804405 0.232850 3.454605 0.0006 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="E") 0.005615 0.157987 0.035540 0.9717 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="F") -0.034341 0.073256 -0.468780 0.6392 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="G") 0.281708 0.123823 2.275095 0.0229 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="H") -0.077860 0.179880 -0.432843 0.6651 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="I") -0.113262 0.211074 -0.536602 0.5916 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="J") 0.080628 0.306731 0.262861 0.7927 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="K") 0.007405 0.137950 0.053680 0.9572 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="L") 0.292274 0.177743 1.644358 0.1002 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="M") -0.231774 0.322806 -0.717999 0.4728 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="N") -0.191414 0.178743 -1.070888 0.2843 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="O") 0.142557 0.146849 0.970776 0.3317 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="P") -0.047116 0.106377 -0.442912 0.6578 
LOG(AWE)*(IND="Q") 0.149554 0.146943 1.017770 0.3088 
LOG(Q) 0.081384 0.048438 1.680171 0.0930 
LOG(E(-1)) 0.690151 0.055848 12.35772 0.0000 
PR100*(IND="A") -0.018936 0.011670 -1.622582 0.1047 
PR100*(IND="B") -0.029689 0.026179 -1.134057 0.2568 
PR100*(IND="C") -0.006365 0.001846 -3.447470 0.0006 
PR100*(IND="D") 0.071966 0.056563 1.272312 0.2033 
PR100*(IND="E") -0.022562 0.020403 -1.105823 0.2689 
PR100*(IND="F") 0.022545 0.033636 0.670269 0.5027 
PR100*(IND="G") 0.049287 0.024469 2.014262 0.0440 
PR100*(IND="H") -0.025924 0.034545 -0.750425 0.4530 
PR100*(IND="I") -0.032840 0.018725 -1.753771 0.0795 
PR100*(IND="J") -0.024571 0.072179 -0.340419 0.7336 
PR100*(IND="K") -0.009948 0.034858 -0.285375 0.7754 
PR100*(IND="L") 0.061079 0.024943 2.448732 0.0144 
PR100*(IND="M") -0.014462 0.031367 -0.461060 0.6448 
PR100*(IND="N") 0.081006 0.032463 2.495347 0.0126 
PR100*(IND="O") -0.006821 0.027133 -0.251407 0.8015 
PR100*(IND="P") -0.064644 0.026285 -2.459379 0.0139 
PR100*(IND="Q") -0.004672 0.013817 -0.338128 0.7353 
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Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.943571     Mean dependent var 5.010690 
Adjusted R-squared 0.938738     S.D. dependent var 1.683505 
S.E. of regression 0.416687     Sum squared resid 966.9336 
F-statistic 130.9560     Durbin-Watson stat 1.860598 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Second-Stage SSR 1402.626 
Instrument rank 515.000000    
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